

EDITOR

ANDREW MCKENNA
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ADVISORY EDITORS

RENÉ GIRARD, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
RAYMUND SCHWAGER, UNIVERSITÄT INNSBRUCK
JAMES WILLIAMS, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

EDITORIAL BOARD

REBECCA ADAMS
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

MARK ANSPACH
ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE, PARIS

CESÁREO BANDERA
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

DIANA CULBERTSON
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

JEAN-PIERRE DUPUY
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE

PAUL DUMOUCHEL
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL

ERIC GANS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

SANDOR GOODHART
WHITMAN COLLEGE

ROBERT HAMERTON-KELLY
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

HANS JENSEN
AARHUS UNIVERSITY, DENMARK

MARK JUERGENSMEYER
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
SANTA BARBARA

CHERYL KIRK-DUGGAN
MEREDITH COLLEGE

PAISLEY LIVINGSTON
MCGILL UNIVERSITY

CHARLES MABEE
ECUMENICAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
DETROIT

JOZEF NIEWIADOMSKI
THEOLOGISCHE HOCHSCHULE, LINZ

SUSAN NOWAK
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

WOLFGANG PALAVER
UNIVERSITÄT INNSBRUCK

MARTHA REINEKE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA

TOBIN SIEBERS
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

THEE SMITH
EMORY UNIVERSITY

MARK WALLACE
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

EUGENE WEBB
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Rates for the annual issue of *Contagion* are: individuals \$10.00; institutions \$32. The editors invite Submission of manuscripts dealing with the theory or practical application of the mimetic model in anthropology, economics, literature, philosophy, psychology, religion, sociology, and cultural studies. Essays should conform to the Conventions of The Chicago Manual of Style and should not exceed a length of 7,500 words including notes and bibliography. Accepted manuscripts will require final Submission on disk written with an IBM compatible program. Please address correspondence to Andrew McKenna, Department of Modern Languages and Literatures, Loyola University, Chicago, IL 60626. Tel: 773-508-2850; Fax: 773-508-3514; Email: amckenn@orion.it.luc.edu.

Member of the Council of Editors of Learned Journals CELJ
© 1996 Colloquium on Violence and Religion at Stanford
ISSN 1075-7201

Cover Illustration: "Margarita philosophica" woodcut, 1508.

CONTENTS

Volume 6
(Spring) 1999

Religion and Symbolic Violence.....	1
<i>Paul Ricoeur</i>	
From Sacrificial Violence to Responsibility: The Education of Moses in <i>Exodus 2-4</i>	12
<i>Sandor Goodhart</i>	
Black-on-Black Violence: The Intramediation of Desire and the Search for a Scapegoat.....	32
<i>Fred Smith</i>	
Obeying Bad Orders and Saving Lives: The Story of a French Officer.....	45
<i>Pierre dElbée</i>	
For a Non-Violent Accord: Educating the Person.....	55
<i>Marie-Louise Martinez</i>	
Ijime.....	77
<i>Paul Dumouchel</i>	
Desire, Technology, and Politics.....	85
<i>Peter Tijmes</i>	
The Educator in the Face of Reform.....	96
<i>Enrique Gómez León</i>	
Adolescence, Indifferentiation, and the Onset of Psychosis.....	104
<i>Henri Grivois</i>	
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	122

FOR A NON-VIOLENT ACCORD: EDUCATING THE PERSON

Marie-Louise Martinez

Education has been criticized, no doubt justly, for the *symbolic violence* of its prohibitions and exclusionary rituals that mirror the violence of society (Bourdieu, etc.). But this criticism is short-sighted. When restraints are removed in teaching and education (in the family and in the school), violence wells up anew and produces at least the following two results: access to meaning and knowledge is restricted; access to the law and its structure-inducing prohibitions is restricted.

The result is that we foster vulnerable personalities who confuse fiction and reality, and who do not hesitate to turn their violence into acts of hostility directed toward themselves, other people, and society. A further consequence has been a certain violent non-differentiation that has tended in turn to produce a violent re-differentiation of society. There is a nostalgia everywhere today for a return to discipline, to the rule of law, etc. One hears talk of the "sanctuary of the classroom" or again of the necessity of preserving a "symbolic cloister." We are not able, purely and simply, to feel remorse for having maintained the rule of a violent symbolic order.

One might ask in what the symbolic consists. How is it connected to teaching and education? Is there not a fundamental violence in the symbolic? Does there exist a less violent symbolic, or even a non-violent one? How might one define it and put it to work in teaching and education? Girardian theory can help us to reinterpret various contributions from a number of authors in the human sciences (Benveniste, Lacan, etc.) and from the personalist philosophy of language. I would like to propose the hypothesis that there are two stages of the symbolic: first, a violent symbolic accord and, second, a non-violent threshold within the symbolic, which alone can serve as an appropriate model for teaching and education.

I. The symbolic and its powers.

We are not using *symbolic* in its specific sense as metaphorical or figurative language as it occurs in myth and poetry but in a more general sense, i.e., to refer to the totality of the sign and code Systems employed by human beings, as that which allows for the production and deployment of significations within society. Stemming from the Greek *symbolein* (to throw or put together, to assemble), the symbolic is that type or order of signs that assembles. Much more than the pure language of linguistics, the symbolic is the totality of verbal, non-verbal, and para-verbal Conventions, of Systems of exchange, and of rites. It also comprises the regulated use of bodies and of nature. Our definition of the symbolic is not idealist: more than simply the expression of ideas, it is also interaction and action, on oneself, on others, and the world. It includes technical and bodily activities to the degree that these have been codified. In this sense, the symbolic (in agreement with philosophers as diverse as Cassirer or Clifford Geertz) can be said to embrace the totality of what is called culture.

But if the symbol *throws or puts together*, it is necessary to discuss what and why and how it does so. The modern science of signs (semiology) has shown that the sign or symbol serves to place in relation. Relying on the contemporary semiology that stems from the American philosopher Pierce, and also on the work of Francis Jacques in France, we can say that this relation, far from being a simple binary one (sign/referent or sign/signifier) is a complex relation which aligns signs with the objects to which they refer, but also with the people deploying those signs. This latter signifying relation, which is intersubjective and social, was invisible in Saussurean semiology. In itself, the symbolic is the product of a complex relation which links people among themselves and the things referred to by the agency of signs. In other words, the basis of the signifying relationship is not the dyad subject/object (relation to objects) but a triadic relation, subject/subject/object (intersubjective and objectal). This triangular relationship, which traverses the intersubjective and the objectal, is a relationship of Convention, underlined in antiquity by Plato in the *Cratylus* (for Hermogenes, a word signified because it bore a resemblance to the thing, while for Cratylus a word signified to the degree that it was based on an accord among human beings.) Meaning is not so much based on the resemblance of the word to the designated thing as on human Convention; the symbolic, which is the fact of mediation among humans, reposes on what links them, which is to say, on desire, on intention, and on Convention.

The symbolic is not completely homogeneous. Variable over time, in space it is defined by the unstable agreement, constantly being renegotiated

within conflicted communities, or even micro-communities, upon which it imposes a fashion and dominant norm. It also varies according to the various modes of discourse (incantation, narrative, description, explication, argumentation, etc.), and according to the categories in force within the various domains of expressive action, or types of texts (mythological, religious, political, legal, commercial, artistic, etc.).

Culture, or the symbolic, is composed of textual areas, each with a textual practice. Wittgenstein says that the fundamental element of these practices is a *language game*. Contemporary sociology (influenced by the Chicago school) has shown that social interactions, what we would call elements of the symbolic, are veritable *language rituals*. *Game* and *ritual* are anthropological terms. These contemporary approaches to the symbolic reveal in part what an anthropological approach to the symbolic ought to illuminate fully. The symbolic rests on a conventional relationship among human beings, and is composed of ordered sequences comprising constraints, prohibitions, and rituals, whose purpose is to Channel endemic violence. As such, the symbolic contains violence, in both senses of the term. We will develop this idea below in relation to Girard's hypotheses. But first let us look at the power of the symbolic.

The symbolic, as the understanding of language games and cultural rituals and as the ability to represent, to interpret, and to act, allows one to benefit from the human experience which it transmits. Much more than something one has or knows, it is the occasion and the instrument to increase one's power over the world, over others, and oneself.

The means of symbolization give one access to the resources of the human heritage, but also to the construction of new meanings. According to the way in which humans distribute meanings, they help to construct social and cultural reality. Language is not only the expression that accompanies or illustrates action, it is also, in itself, a form of action upon the world. When humans listen, read, understand, speak, write, or when they manipulate other sign Systems, they change the world. To take part in the symbolic is to engage in *ap Praxis*, i.e., in a transformative action upon the real, and on social reality and its organization.

But, what's more, by this action on the objective world, the symbolic allows the subject to recognize himself as such. "It is in and through language that man recognizes himself as a subject: because language alone founds in reality, in the reality that is that of being, the concept of the ego... is ego who says ego," writes Benveniste in his fundamental work, *Problems of General Linguistics* (I, 259-60). The human being as a potential subject becomes an actually existing subject by speaking and by taking up language.

He is the result of acts of enunciation (i.e., he is the producer of Statements) through which he confers upon himself (though the individualism of this perspective is subject to criticism, for the process is one of intersubjectivity) an ontological consistency which he draws from language. In other words, it is by daring to take possession of language (oral, and, *a fortiori*, written) and by making use of the resources of the symbolic that the human being begins the process of subjectivisation. By means of the symbolic, the human participates in producing objective reality and by so doing, he defines himself as a subject. He becomes an *auctor* and thereby performs an act of authority (*auctoritas*). He increases his prestige. To be rich in symbolic resources is, for the most part, the precondition for gaining access to other desirable resources (on the social, professional, and material, etc. level). It entitles one to consideration and to gratifying social respect. Conversely, to be deprived of these resources would, on this level, be a serious disadvantage. Thanks to a mastery of the symbolic, one is not only better equipped to survive in our sophisticated societies, one is also able to make a more substantial contribution to the polity, to the democratic System, and to participate in culture, in familial and business life, etc. The better one's mastery of symbolic codes, the better one is able to work for more equitable social institutions. By the same token, one is also better equipped to lie, to manipulate, and to oppress. Thus the symbolic is definitely linked to the power to do good as well as evil. The place where being becomes charged with intersubjectivity, the symbolic space of desire is thus eminently desirable and desired.

II. School and the Symbolic

The function of schooling and education has always been to give infants access to the process of signification (French: *enseigner-Latin: insignare*) and hence to the symbolic. *Educare*: to nourish; symbolic nourishment? An etymology at least as probable as *to go out of*. Here etymology provides, as it often does, an eloquent memorial translating expectations that have always surrounded school and scholarship. The expectation has been that from the bosom of education students might be released from ignorance by drawing more knowledge, material goods, power, and being. For a long time, school, invested with these expectations, has been able to appear as the symbolic and social salvation for uneducated illiterates.

But these hopes have given way to a painful disappointment. The school, with its mandate to provide gratis secular and compulsory instruction, began the general distribution of the basic symbolic codes (reading, writing, arithmetic). But if illiteracy has long been on the decline, a new form of non-

participation in the basic forms of knowledge and in the codes and practices of literacy is now appearing on the other side of illiteracy. Now we are confronted not only by a resistance to school, but perhaps by a resistance generated by the school itself (somewhat in the manner of diseases termed iatrogenic, which are caused by the medication), meaning that the school cannot help but question itself about its responsibility. Are schools producing illiterates? How are we to understand this?

Schools today do not always give access to the forms of the symbolic that they value most highly, nor do they necessarily open the door to socio-economic Integration. Worse, by their failure to educate, schools can inflict true symbolic disqualification. Thanks to their passage through the school System, illiterates owe to it the certification, as it were, of their symbolic disqualification. Illiteracy is stigmatized deprivation and is recognized as such: to be deprived of the symbolic (left with an incompetent grasp of the written and oral codes of communication) entails exclusion. Present day students have been cruelly disappointed by school. Thus we can understand that they turn against it with hate and resentment, and also against those whom they, rightly or wrongly, consider to have been luckier or more privileged in their appropriation of the prestigious symbolic. We can also understand, insofar as they are able, that they should wage a symbolic guerilla campaign to devalue the symbolic norm by which they are disqualified, in the familiar little back-and-forth game of rejected/rejecter.

This bitter disappointment with school gets translated into acts of hostility against the self, against the other, and society. It takes the form of resentment, but is never anything but the obverse of betrayed expectation. It does not put the necessity of education into question, on the contrary. It makes it all the more imperative that educational researchers provide a radical critique of the violence of the symbolic and the entry into the signifying process. The anthropological approach, supported by mimetic theory, will provide a better understanding of the violence inherent in both the symbolic and educational Orders, and enable a search for alternatives.

III. The Violence of the Symbolic and of the Entry into the Signifying Process

With the preceding paragraphs we are already embarked on a description of the forms of violence inherent in the symbolic. The symbolic is an accord (a series of accords varying according to specific circumstances) which defines a Community united by rituals of expulsion. The symbolic generates desire and the competitive struggle to appropriate it. Thus it comprises all the phases of violence in the mimetic process. More exactly, one can surmise

that the symbolic is based on the sacrifice of the vietim who then, according to Girard, becomes the transcendental signifier: "In the founding mechanism, reconciliation is achieved against and around the vietim. There is no meaning that is not adumbrated by it and that does not appear simultaneously to be transcended by it" (143). This hypothesis is difficult to demonstrate historically, but one can find arguments in other authors that support it. Let's look at the symbolic in relation to sacrificial anthropogenesis.

We can find quite eloquent support in Benveniste's *The Vocabulary of Indo-European Institutions*, for example that the very notion of Community derives from the "munia," which is the festive meal associated with sacrifice and gladiatorial games. It is also Benveniste who, concluding some interesting analyses in his *Problems of General Linguistics*, discloses the very particular Status of the grammatical third person. A veritable non-person, he/she is described in terms that allow us to recognize the ambivalence characteristic of the sacrificial vietim. "From its function as a non-personal form, the 'third person'¹ derives its capacity to become both a form of respect, which makes of the person something much more than a person, as well as a form of insult, which allows for the person to be annihilated" (1,231).

We have a real case of sacrifice with this expulsion of the third. These very precise remarks allow someone acquainted with anthropological concepts to recognize the uncanny similarity of the grammatical function of third person to the classical notion of the *pharmakon* with its semantic ambivalence. The vietim whose exclusion provides communal accord would be the originary referent of this third person. Benveniste is thus very close to recognizing, in his turn, in the exclusion of the third, which he observes and reveals, the foundational function of cultural consensus: "As soon as the pronoun / appears in a Statement where it conjures up, explicitly or implicitly, the pronoun *you* in such a way as to place the two of them in Opposition to *he*, a human experience is inaugurated anew, revealing the linguistic instrument which gave rise to it" (II, 68).¹

¹ Benveniste writes: "Now we see the human sciences develop in their entirety, a vast anthropology (in the sense of a general science of man) being formed...I am always acutely aware that it is the signifier that unifies the human sciences in their ensemble"(I, 38). But Benveniste was not able to contribute to this project of epistemological unification. Doubtless captive of the notion of structure, he could not focus on origins, still less on their sacrificial dimension, which he has nonetheless exposed massively. I will pursue below this discussion with reference to the linguistic model of intersubjective identification.

The symbolic, in the sense that Benveniste has given it, i.e., as the representation of the original or transcendental or archetypal signifier, is indeed that anteriority or precondition required for the construction of culture and society. As such, the symbolic fully justifies the intuition of the linguist concerning the possibility of unifying the human sciences. As the immediate consequence of the *sacrificial accord* on which it rests (the signifier being the first substitute for the victim), the *symbolic accord* is the precondition laterally informing all the other conventional forms contained within it (linguistic, cultural, social, economic, political, etc.), with their contractual regionalization.

In sum, Benveniste, without having formulated the sacrificial hypothesis, nor *a fortiori* being concerned about subjecting it to a critique, is satisfied with demonstrating it at work.

One can come up with the same findings in Lacan's work. He discovers and minutely explores what he calls the symbolic, and what we would call the primary threshold of anthropogenesis. The Name-of-the-Father is the founding death that gives to language its signifying power. This is the ultimate rule of linguistic structuralism declared by Benveniste to be unsurpassable. It is the key for entering into a culture structured by language as a System of differentiations.

In fact, to enter into the symbolic accord is to accept the rule of sacrificial violence that founds all culture. Lacan has shown with great precision and subtlety how the unique entry of the subject into the symbolic is negotiated, tracing its intersubjective history. In this regard, his contribution is considerable. Lacan's project, in our view, is extremely interesting because it goes so far as to discover the meaning of the sacrificial symbolic accord for ontogenesis. The author, in fact, comes close to discovering the role of sacrifice in the symbolic accord. He can only understand it, however, as being of the order of myth. He attributes no anthropological credibility to sacrifice, nor *a fortiori* any ethical value, whether negative or positive. How, in that case, can we think of reducing violence or of getting beyond it by calling for the reintegration of the third? Lacan shows that the sacrifice of the third that provides the basis for a field of differentiated communication, in the last analysis, is confirmed by the sacrificial accord. We must simply accept the *exclusion of the third (The-Name-of-the-Father) as the guarantee of the code*. This author, like Benveniste, does not really see what he reveals. For him, sacrifice remains a purely nominal given without a referent because sacrifice in *Totem and Taboo* functions as a pure fable. Thereby he remains a prisoner of the mythological misrecognition of sacrifice, which is what characterizes culture

in its violent accord. This allows us to understand in passing why the symbolic is most often viewed as nothing but a fable; this nominalist use of the term simply comes from the misrecognition that forbids us to recognize the revelation of sacrifice as a real fact. Which of course prevents us from seeking to move beyond it. For our part, we rediscover sacrifice by calling for the integration of the victimized third who had been previously expelled.

One could show that this anthropogenetic violence is echoed and repeated at the sociogenetic and especially ontogenetic levels.

The symbolic accord contains violence at several levels, which we will rapidly review before attempting to determine to what degree it might be possible to envisage a non-violent symbolic.

Because the symbolic is eminently desirable by virtue of the power and the surplus of being which it confers, it has much to do with appropriative craving, and so with rivalry, and with competitiveness, and also with the rejection of those who, due to their disqualification, both ratify and enhance the qualification and prestige of those who enjoy mastery of the culture's codes.

It is well known fact that inasmuch as certain symbolic areas are highly prized as a source of great power, access to them is strictly monitored and shut, indeed placed off-limits by highly complex rites of initiation (education is replete with them).

The symbolic accord is certainly not the result of a fully conscious or totally rational human decision. It is probably not homogenous; it is frequently called into question here and there, or transformed, or restored, etc. And no doubt it is compartmentalized into many kinds of communities and sub-communities. According to Wittgenstein, language in its totality consists of a multitude of *language games*, with their specific codes and rules.

To enter into language means to learn these different games and their specific rules. Some are very simple and others very complicated, demanding long and difficult apprenticeships. The first apprenticeships occur in the family, and then get developed in the other institutions of daily life, i.e., in school, among neighbors, in business, sport, church, clubs, etc. Thereafter highly specialized and highly precise aspects of the symbolic will be developed in function of the apprentice's relationships, his group-memberships, education, academic or Professional specialties. Theoretical ethnologists, who study the sociology of human interaction, refer to cultural *affiliation*. According to them, these language games, rather than games, would be genuine instances of ritual requiring that their accepted Conventions, both written and oral, be respected under pain of expulsion

from those communities where they are in force. Ritual belongs to the sphere of the sacred, and its prescribed Conventions are absolute. A ritual is a little ceremony around sacred objects; it is a matter of the utmost importance that rites be scrupulously carried out, for they concern life and death. In a ritual, to manipulate a sacred object is to attempt to appease the wrath and violence of the gods (or of human beings), for they pose a threat both to the individual and the Community.

This anthropological and sociological theory of interaction is very illuminating; it helps us better to understand why the symbolic in its totality (in all its domains) is an accord among human beings. This symbolic accord consists of a series of Conventions, of games and rituals, more or less complex, which establish the rules for containing and permanently dealing with human violence. But if ethnological theory, through its notion of ritual, shows us that human sociality is permanently imbued with violence and the sacred, it unfortunately does not inform us about the source of that violence. Thanks to mimetic theory, however, we are able to see desire and sacrifice as its outcome. Thus to try to gain access the symbolic is to expose oneself to the foundational violence that makes man a wolf to man, and no doubt to compromise oneself with it. It is not surprising that some people refrain from ever risking it (a perspective, by the way, that might offer a fresh view of autism). And by the same token one can understand all the wounds and self-deprivations of those who, having striven to master the symbolic, have, at some point in their effort, become discouraged by the oppositions they encountered.

For clearly the symbolic accord is not simply something acquired, a past victory for the human species on the phylo- or anthropogenic level; it is, first and foremost, a requirement and an indispensable modality of social existence.

On the level of ontogenesis (i.e., individual development), perhaps one must first have experienced in one's life and close relationships the lack of such an accord before one can consent to enter the symbolic. In other words, it is likely that it is through a personal crisis experienced in one's immediate relationships that one feels the need to gain access to the symbolic. According to anthropologists (speaking of anthropogenesis, i.e., the evolution of the species) as well as psychologists (speaking of psychogenesis, i.e., the evolution of the individual), access to the symbolic is a threshold that can only be crossed with great difficulty and by passing through a crisis.

Wallon and Lacan have clearly shown, each in his fashion, that at the level of ontogenesis it is always the result of an interindividual crisis that the

subject is enabled (or not) to join the Community of Speakers. The leap is hard to take because of the weight of the renunciation it entails, but the result is decisive. Moreover, it is clear that the leap is not made once and for all. There are, no doubt, several stages by which one enters into the symbolic accord.

To a greater or lesser degree, all human beings are in the symbolic: thus they share with others certain conventional Systems of meaning, certain language games and certain rites. However, the passage is not easy, nor is it always homogenous, nor is it irreversible, and it is accompanied by a host of dangers: these can be understood on both the psychological and sociological level.

In terms of psychology, the pathologies associated with the impossible entry into the symbolic are *autism* or *aphasia*, for instance. Here the subject is prevented from generating Symbols. In the case of *delirium*, he has recourse to such aberrant and idiosyncratic signs that they depart from generally established Conventions, and thus can no longer communicate or be shared with others. Wittgenstein has shown that there can be no such thing as an individual language. And of course the essence of the symbolic is that it can be shared conventionally with a group of Speakers irrespective of its size.

On the level of society we find additional problems. It is simply the case that not all language games or social areas and symbolic Systems enjoy equal Status in a given culture. Certain of them are much more esteemed and valued than others, depending upon the culture, the milieu, and the historical period. These require a long apprenticeship, they develop considerable abilities, they confer superior power and prestige upon those who master them. Written language with its systematizing power is a highly valued source of prestige, but then so are many oral language games, involving explanation, or argumentation, or injunction, or theatrical rhetoric.

It is clear that there is a large amount of psychosocial intimidation that figures in the apprenticeship to both oral and written language; this is the main point that Bourdieu has developed in his discussion of symbolic violence. The Speaker with dominant language competence, the one who seems the most authorized to speak, puts pressure on the others, who often lose and dissolve their abilities in the presence of the norm. Illiteracy is perhaps the most visible manifestation of this intimidation. It is likely that those involved with determining significations compete with each other to capture and exercise exclusive control over them, rather than allow them to circulate freely among everyone. Instead they seek to trip each other up.

But let us try to get a better view of the violence of the symbolic on the various levels where it appears and according to its different effects. For if it is so that man is the symbolic and hence they social animal, the beneficiary of an articulated language (the well-known precondition of his evolutionary success), it is nonetheless obvious that he has paid a high price for this privilege. The cost can be inferred from past and present crises on the level of his interindividual relationships, both psychological and social, as well as on the level of Community.

In order to examine the interindividual crisis in the history of the subject, we will turn our attention to those disciplines that have illustrated it best: psychoanalysis, with its well-known model, but also sociology and anthropology.

Freud and his successors, Mélanie Klein, Jacques Lacan, etc., have helped to show that the development of the child is contingent upon its relations with the mother, but also with the father, during its first years. The relational configuration within the family triad promotes (or inhibits) access to language, to the symbolic, and to a more or less balanced development. In other words, these relationships can produce either dysfunction and violence or, conversely, harmonious personal development.

Following birth, the infant's early attachment to the mother can very quickly become lethal if lasts too long, if it shifts into dependency, etc. This dyadic and dual relationship can only provide structure if it allows room for a third, i.e., for the father or his representative (the Name-of-the-Father for Lacan) whose function is to provide distance. For this to happen, the dyad fits itself within a triadic relationship. This permits Separation to occur from the prenatal corporal bond, now outmoded and stifling, and reinscribes the child in a larger Community. The transition is delicate because it involves renouncing one's initial prenatal beatitude in order to gain access to the universe of multiple, open-ended relationships with the world of culture by the intermediary of signs. Of course this Separation ought to occur by stages in a gentle manner. Here too, it is necessary to mourn the immediacy of the thing and to accept the rule and the law, of which the third is in some fashion both the witness and the guarantor, and which provide the basis of Convention and signification. The conditions for this access are difficult and costly, as we have seen, all the more so since the advantages of the symbolic are not rapid but require a long period of babbling. The decision to exchange ones initial Situation of fusional immediacy for a new and initially less intimate relationship with a symbolic Community is not a conscious one. It is negotiated under duress as the only possible resolution of a relational crisis.

For psychoanalysis, it is through the Oedipus complex as a conflictual relational process marked by rivalry that a sufficient distance is gained from the mother and an appropriate place provided for the father and the third (neither too exalted nor too minimized). It goes without saying that the delicate balance in this triadic relational configuration is of concern to each of its actors. Each has to make a personal contribution for there to be a relational harmony that ought to return or be re-created in various other occasions of daily life and with other partners. The triad is most likely the basic figure of all social and relational geometry (see Théodore Caplow, *Two Against One*).

For the psychologist Henri Wallon, the leap into the symbolic, the "primary passage for the intellectual future of the child as it has been for the species is the one that takes him in his fusion with the object or the Situation and leads him to the moment where he can give them an equivalent made of images, Symbols, or propositions" (155). This occurs as the outcome of relational crisis very similar to the one envisaged by the psychoanalytical model. Both mimeticism and the aspiration to fusional contagion with the adult model very quickly become ambivalent: "cannibalism provides an image of it: absorb the beloved or admired being; annihilate it as well, by sacrificing it to oneself. Inversely, to become absorbed into it so as to achieve a more intimate assimilation, even to the point of renouncing oneself and becoming abolished" (156). Wallon insists, however, on drawing some important distinctions from the Oedipus Complex; this ambivalent rivalry is not by any means limited to the sexual domain, and it is not deployed exclusively in regard to the parent of the opposite sex. The process must be conceptualized generally, Freud over restricted its scope. And finally, the order stated by Freud must be inverted, according to which "the infant begins by wanting to claim the mother from the father by wishing to see the latter disappear. Then, helped by his remorse, he takes the latter for the object of his admiration and as a model to be imitated. In fact, the order is the inverse of this" (ibid). Below, we will have occasion to underline the strange resemblance of Wallon's model to that of Rene Girard.

In any event, it is clearly as the result of a serious relational crisis that the leap into the symbolic is accomplished. This makes it easier to understand how the risk run by the subject itself requires the difficult renunciation implied by the engagement with the symbolic. There is a loss and expenditure that will have to be renegotiated many times and on many levels, throughout the psychogenesis and the entire life of the subject.

For the development of the subject is accomplished by a concomitant sociogenesis that allows him to adapt to a group, a Community, indeed to a

heterogenous hyper-community with socially differentiated subgroups arranged in hierarchies. There the subject, whatever his original background, has to come to terms with new knowledge and new symbolic codes, as for example those of writing. It is evident that his social distance from writing codes will make their assimilation problematic.

The distance and the Separation will be all the more favorably experienced to the degree that there are third person mediators (teachers and guides) who are able to reassure, grant permission, and provide bridges. The attachment to certain milieux of origin may seem to prevent access to a new symbolic universe. Novelty can often be legitimately feared: one knows what one is losing, one has no idea what one might gain. One risks well-established modes of relationship, and one fears, with good reason, not to be welcomed in the new circles. Social distance is an open wound.

The role of the third person is crucial on the level of anthropogenesis for understanding how to access the symbolic. Lacan, following Freud, refers to this when he speaks of the Name-of-the-Father as the necessary prerequisite for gaining access to the symbolic. Lacan is not simply thinking of the empirical father in the family structure, or his representative (who on occasion can be the grandmother or anyone else), he is thinking of the archaic Father of the primal horde to whom Freud refers in his final work, *Totem and Taboo*. It is by the collective murder of the oppressive Father who claims all the women for himself, and who would forbid everything to his sons, that the sons establish the Community. A foundational sacrifice forms the basis for the signifying Community, speaking and acting with its rules and Conventions in a common accord of equals.

Thus, in the psychoanalytic theory of origins, the entry into the symbolic pact is violent. For the individual it commemorates the assent to collective violence. In fact, according to the explicit Statements of Lacan, it represents the Integration of the third person as the dead Father: the one who founds the fraternal consensus. Accordingly, it is important to bear in mind that the symbolic accord, achieved as the outcome of a crisis and of a sacrificial plot, is tainted by an initial violence that has laid the foundation for the signifying Community. In other words, to enter into the symbolic, one must first give one's assent to a primordial violence and be willing to perpetuate it by means of the sacrificial exclusion of the third person. Because the symbolic bears the traces of a sacrificial anthropogenesis, does that mean that each person in turn, in order to gain access to language, must ratify it with his or her consent? Yes, according to Lacan, under pain of sinking into psychosis. What he terms *the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-*

Father would be for the subject the impossibility of assenting to that foundational violence, to the Integration of the third as the excluded one.

For us, it is a question of seeing the symbolic not simply as the general case with its structured and universal differentiation capped by the signifier of the-Name-of-the-Father, but, on the contrary, as a genetic structure with levels distinguished by thresholds. Lacan helped to show the first threshold of the entry to the symbolic, the one commemorated by an arch of human concord marking a first limitation or regulation of sacrificial violence. But if that phase of human culture was the first threshold of anthropogenesis, it was not the last.

For us, the second anthropogenetic threshold, a truly non-violent threshold, implies a critique of violence (a critique all the more difficult to accomplish in that it needs to be radical without, however, stepping outside of the category of sacrifice) and, especially, the integration of the third as a person. Here it is perhaps a question of integrating the excluded third as much on the level of logic as of a previously excluded human third. This suggests how little our view can accommodate itself to the hegemonic rule of binarism that governs the structurally differentiated symbolic space of sacrificial anthropogenesis. The instauration of a new cultural Space by means of a non-violent symbolic accord is characterized by the integration of the third who had been previously excluded from the sacrificial scheme. Thus our postulate differs fundamentally from Lacan's: we distinguish two genealogical thresholds within the symbolic.

Now we must consider the multiple aspects of the violence that occurs when the subject enters the symbolic and common sense:

There is violence against oneself when one gives up fusion with the primitive mother, with the immediacy of things, with the warmth of one's original communities. This is a scalpel-like violence that makes separations that are always premature. There is violence done to the self in the original act of Separation. Then there is the violence done to the other as the excluded third and dead primitive Father, and then to all those who by their expulsion provide cohesion to the gathered assembly. If the symbolic accord occurs by means of a plot against the sacrificial third, then the number of these excluded thirds from various accords is great.

Finally there is the violence of every sociogenesis that requires giving consent to dubious acts of collusion. To assent to new alliances seems to require betrayal of the previous ones. When a child of the third or fourth world gains access to writing, new resonance is given to the notion of the dead or excluded third. For his entry into a sacrificially constituted

Community is ratified by all who are not part of it. In some fashion he must assent to a symbolic accord based on the exclusion of his own people.

By resolving these crises, as expensive as they are profitable, the subject leaves behind his State of dependence and acquires the words and the other symbolic resources of the tribe. He pays his dues and acquires his symbol. On the other hand, one can understand that there are some who would never deign nor be able to do this, who prefer to lock themselves into autistic silence, or resign themselves to the humiliation of illiteracy.

And so the question arises as to whether there might not be a less violent entry into the symbolic. Couldn't there be a more open manner to enter language and the ritual language games of culture, one that would not be based on excluding one or more third persons? Couldn't there be a symbolic accord to integrate those third persons who had been previously excluded, where the act of sacrifice, if it still remained, would no longer require the eviction of the other but rather the oblation and gift of self? Is such a thing possible? The structuralist model (Benveniste, Lacan) and psychoanalytic models (Freud, Lacan), even if they practice such a thing on the level of therapy, really have no place for it theoretically. They are utterly locked into the anthropological and logical rule of the expelled third. But such is not the case with Girard's anthropological model, which allows us to understand not only the archaic mode of sacrificial anthropogenesis, but also to conceptualize and contemplate the overcoming of violence. Based on his model, one can envisage the possibility of integrating the other as third in the discursive praxis of culture and the symbolic.

In personalist language philosophy we find the concepts and tools we need to conceptualize the integration of the third within educational relationships. But the critique provided by mimetic theory remains essential; it summons us to be on guard, for integrating the third can produce either the best or the worst results.

IV. The Person as Model of a Non-Violent Symbolic

Clearly, an intersubjectivity characterized by a less violent mode of relationship would favor the emergence of a less violent subject. To arrive at this goal, two requirements must be met.

We must avoid sacrificing the third, by integrating the previously excluded third into a genuinely triadic structure. The principle of non-sacrificial communication is not exclusion/collusion, rather it is coalition offered to each person in a synergy which harms no one. The result is an unstable equilibrium, given the rarity of its occurrence on the anthropological level.

We must avoid the undertow of mimeticism. This is all the harder to do inasmuch the process is constantly shadowed by the caricatures offered to it by perverse triangular structures, i.e., those described by René Girard as epiphanies of mimetic desire, which must constantly be undone in human action and interaction.

The integration the excluded third proceeds from an anthropology of the person, allowing us to determine what would apply to everyone in communicational and educational interchange. Such universal validity cannot be found by empirical means. In empirical reality, the pressure of chance and the overpowering force of events determine that, most of the time, habitual conditioning and archaic reflexes carry the day. Here the oppression of the strongest prevails, along with inequity and a lack of reciprocity.

Must we then base this validity on a transcendental *a priori*? The modern-day followers of Kant, Habermas, Apel (see especially his *L'Éthique à l'âge de la science*) or Jacques, pursue this line of thought. For these language philosophers, ethics can be based on reason, taken as the critical precondition of the transcendental Community. Each individual is bound by the rational and ethical rules of language games (the principle of non-contradiction in argumentation, of verification, of respecting sworn testimony, etc.). Each person is responsible to fulfill the obligations to which he has assented by taking up language with its language games and rules.

The position of Lévinas, though similar to this, nevertheless is different. For him, the ethical demand is neither empirical nor rationalist, rather it obeys a demand anterior to every transcendental *a priori*: the irruption of the other as a primary given, prior to culture and even to experience. The other, especially by his face and the nakedness of his face, is the wretch (*Je pauvre*) whose irruption makes an absolute demand on me. For this philosopher, the simple existence of the other requires me to respond to him, he challenges my responsibility, I become his protector, his debtor.² To the canonical question: "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Gen. 4, 10) an ethics based on responsibility replies with an unequivocal "yes."

But can we, for all that, establish an ethics, or *a fortiori* a practical reason (with a rule governing communicational practice) on such an excessive sense of responsibility vis à vis the second person? Pushed to the

²In *L'Humanisme de l'autre comme*, Lévinas writes: "The epiphany of the absolutely other is a face, where the Other calls upon me and signs an order by his very nakedness, by his very denudation" (53).

limit, if I owe everything to you, we again have a lack of reciprocity, and my effacement can appear to be the supreme ruse of an invasive and arrogant ego, swollen with its own sense of responsibility. Will not the other feel crushed by my solicitude, or is he not condemned to an exhaustive bidding competition in a kind of potlatch of responsibility (after you, no, after you, etc.)? This could be a sterile rivalry driven by egotism, no matter how moral. What's more, it is difficult to see how it would be possible to base an ethics and educational rule on the preeminence of the oblativistic self. Very quickly the subject being educated could feel himself crushed by the limitless solicitude of the willing hostage who would be his educator.

Lévinas himself is well aware of the folly of this responsibility of an ego unconditionally in debt to the other in a dyadic relationship. It is only with the other as *third*; as a third person, that a genuine ethics and rule appear. The order of justice and of equitable measure appear when the third appears: if I owe everything to you, it is to the degree that you do not oppress the third, the defenseless wretch, the widow, and the orphan. The ethical order is the Obligation to intervene, to step in between you and him. It is he who makes us give up the excessive one-sidedness of a univocal responsibility. It is our concern for the third that gives us the Standard and rule for a good life.

One cannot establish an ethic without envisaging the relationship with the other; indeed we must go further and situate ourselves in a triadic relationship where I am the mediator between my feuding brothers, and the defender of the excluded third person. Lévinas, with his beautiful concept of *that one-ness* (*Hiêltê*: the personal third who is present despite his absence, between us), takes a great step toward establishing a truly transcultural ethic.

Nevertheless, this chivalrous morality, when pushed to the limit, appears to remain too much beneath the yoke of the primacy of Husserlian transcendental subjectivity (see Jacques, "E. Lévinas") to allow for the constitution of a truly relational anthropology.

But in the anthropology which flows from Girard's theory of the scapegoat we see the possibility of positing, more radically, the integration of the previously excluded third person as a meta-value. The social and cultural order, the dynamic of interpersonal and institutional relations, are traditionally founded on the expulsion of the third, the reconciling victim, the scapegoat whose exclusion forms the basis for the others' collaboration. But a higher demand for justice and reconciliation (inherited, according to Girard, from the prohibition against violent sacrifice that originates in the Bible) requires that this persecution and this exclusion be denounced. Thus

we can see in the command to integrate the previously excluded third, precisely the value called for above whose legitimacy would be above suspicion.

Indeed, this value is no longer open to the charge of ethnocentrism. For although it has been inspired particularly by the Biblical text and the Judeo-Christian tradition, the command to make room for the stranger, for the pauper, for the least among us, does not belong to a project of cultural domination. Rather, this value is anti-cultural to the extent that every culture remains based on the scapegoat. From within, it surpasses and denounces the culture that mocks it. No culture nor oppressed minority is in doubt about this. Each Claims the dignity of the scapegoat in its own defense, and justly so, only to forget and finally disavow it when it becomes a persecutor in its turn. This value can be considered transcultural and available to every culture for the simple reason that it really belongs to none. It comes from beyond culture and from the wholly other.

This imperative no longer has anything to do with the abstract universal, nor is it the case of each individual defending himself with indifference to others. Rather, it is a question each time of being attentive and responsive to the individual face of the poor person that this particular Situation has bruised more or less covertly, more or less elegantly.

The integration of the third is not asymmetrical; the ego does not have primacy by reason of its Obligation. Each person in an intersubjective relationship has been invited in. The subject can and should proclaim his own suffering, like the psalmist, if he has been the target of persecution. To call for justice from within intersubjectivity, even in ones own favor, frees everyone (on the condition, of course, that one does not lock oneself into the victimary posture, which consists in occupying the place of the victim in order to be better able to oppress).

Final ly, this value can be considered to be a true meta-value in that it provides a powerful criterion for evaluating other values that have become "insane."

The goal of education is this: at the end of the educational process to produce a non-egocentric personality marked by a dynamic consciousness, confident of itself and its possibilities, capable of engaging itself with critical awareness in communal action and thought without excluding itself or others. The final result of the educational process ought to be a self-esteem linked to an empathic perception of the other, lived out in mutual and reciprocal respect. Thus the feeling of belonging to a larger Community would reinforce ones concern for the other, both proximate and distant. The common allegiance to a transcendent social project (both hyper- and

multicommunal) would authorize a plan of action and thought oriented toward an unfolding future, without ever losing its concern for the other in his or her singularity. And while it is always possible to assent to the free gift of oneself, no common good can ever justify the sacrifice of the third person. Nothing can ever justify the exclusion of another individual nor particular category of people. The integration of the third is the sole norm in terms of which all other educational values can be criticized and implemented.

Now if the interlocutive and relational integration of the excluded third is the supreme value of education, it directs us to the notion of the *person*. The concept has been explored in many disciplinary fields (theater, law, grammar, philosophy, theology, etc.); a relational anthropology of language is best suited to give an account of the results. Christian theology provides an exceptional model: God, who is unique yet nevertheless articulated in himself by a loving intersubjectivity. This is the direct opposite of the old anthropogenetic structure of group collusion based on the exclusion of the third. We might say that the Holy Spirit is the model of the integrated third who installs the others in their plenitude. This non-anthropological example offered by trinitarian theology is difficult to understand and even more to make happen. Augustine, who worked for many years on *De Trinitate*, is clear on this point.

Thus the person is conceptualized according to a triadically intersubjective model of relationship where each contributes to the definition of oneself and the other by participating in a dynamic that produces meaning, authentic subjects, and equitable institutions (see Ricoeur, *Le Soi comme un autre*). Also, the person is the intersubjective result of the intersubjective process of identification, each with the others. Following the habitual notion of the person, one can say that each ought to be treated as a person to the degree that he or she is called upon to become one. In this way this demanding model of intersubjectivity and subjectivity can be reevaluated by a relational anthropology summoned to establish a true science of the human. Specifically, its future task is to bring about a reevaluation of the subject of education.

The person is an *ethical value*, but also *apactical value*: the person is generated during and at the end of a process of personification through language games and the interlocutive, symbolic practices in which the subject engages.

In addition, the person is also a *cognitive value*. Indeed, meaning will be all the more effective and cognition all the greater in proportion as the dialogue is genuine. Now true dialogue is conditioned by the intersubjective

configuration of the person. A monologue that takes preemptory hold of meaning does not permit new knowledge to arise. Confronted by a monologue, the other cannot operate in the interlocutive mode nor grasp meaning in a way that recontextualizes it effectively (F. Jacques). Only the framework of dialogue with its cognitive conflict and collaboration (objections, contradictions, arguments, counter-arguments) increases meaning and knowledge. Both dialogue theory and the social psychology of learning confirm these notions. But the dyadic relationship of dialogue is not all that is required, we must be more specific and go as far as the rule requiring the integration of the third. So that the interlocutors may be placed at optimal distance to each other, they have to leave room for the other as the third who has been excluded from their ideological connivance. For the dyad, whether it be fusional in the mode of collusion or, contrariwise, oppositional and agonistic, allows of no further augmentation of meaning, it is condemned to a partisan repetition of the same. In a true dialogue, however, the excluded third who is not addressed (the one who is habitually overlooked) ought to be able, actually or potentially, to speak in his or her turn.

From this one can deduce that the person as model and intersubjective process of the integration of the third is not only the canonical subject of education, but also the value that in various ways fulfills its ultimate goals. The fostering of the subject, fully as much as the goal of an integrated and thus more equitable educational institution, returns us the person understood as a value that is both ethical and practical. And as for the attainment of knowledge as the product of the educational dialogue, it is achieved by a personalizing process that in itself represents a cognitive value.

In sum, if the person as the result of the integration of the third is truly the desired value, it is clear that educators ought not only to teach that value in an explicit way, but especially put it into practice in the process itself.

V. The Conditions Required for a Person-Oriented Pedagogy and Education

We need to create the conditions for relationships that would integrate the third without setting in motion a mimetic undertow. The various triadic combinations of which the educational relationship is susceptible within the multitude of possibilities offered by education ought to serve as the focus of study for teams and entire laboratories. Here we can already formulate some of the rules governing the basic triangle constituted by the following relationships: (1) master/student/object of knowledge; (2) master/student/other Student; (3) master/student/student concluding the educational process.

(1) The teacher as mediator between the Student and the object of knowledge needs to make knowledge attractive and accessible without focusing the desire of the Student on oneself by establishing external mediation.

(2) The teacher as mediator between students needs to make concern for the other the rule and make use of prohibitions that provide structure. Value is given to each without competitive manipulation, making sure that emulation within collaboration benefits the Student who is having the greatest difficulty. Confront conflict rather than stifle it.

(3) The teacher as mediator between the Student and him/herself needs to maintain an attitude of confidence supported by reason. Integrate the weakest Student, giving helpful evaluations, and making use of the support provided by mutual agreement.

VI. Conclusion

The human is a symbolic animal. Meaning links the real to the relationship of desire that humans maintain among themselves. This relationship can be violent, a byproduct of mimetic behavior that leads to sacrificial exclusion (the primary accord of anthropogenesis). This relationship can also be an external mediation of desire based upon genuine transcendence and cooperation. For the latter, personal structure as the framework of a triangularly transformed inter- and intrasubjectivity provides the model. It is specifically applicable in education, but also in the other areas of life. It constitutes the accord of non-violent anthropogenesis. It is not a prelude to anthropogenesis, but its distant horizon and greatest expression.

(translated by William Mishler)

WORKS CITED

- Apel, Karl Otto. 1987. *L'Éthique à l'âge de la science: l'apriori de la communauté communicationnelle et les fondements de l'éthique*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Benveniste, Emile. 1966. *Problèmes de la linguistique générale*. Paris: Gallimard.
- . 1969. *Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
- Caplow, Theodore. 1984. *Two Against One*. Paris: ESF.
- Jacques, François. 1990. "E. Lévinas: entre le primat phénoménologique du moi et l'allégeance éthique à autrui." *Études phénoménologiques* 12.

- Girard, René.** 1978. *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde*. Paris: Grasset.
- Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1972. *L'Humanisme de l'autre homme*. Paris: Livre de Poche.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1990. *Le Soi comme un autre*. Paris. Seuil.
- Walton, Henri. 1970. *De l'Acte à la pensée*. Paris: Flammarion.